Sparse Oblique Decision Tree for Power System Security Rules Extraction
  and Embedding by Hou, Qingchun et al.
 1 
Abstract—Increasing the penetration of variable generation has 
a substantial effect on the operational reliability of power systems. 
The higher level of uncertainty that stems from this variability 
makes it more difficult to determine whether a given operating 
condition will be secure or insecure. Data-driven techniques 
provide a promising way to identify security rules that can be 
embedded in economic dispatch model to keep power system 
operating states secure. This paper proposes using a sparse 
weighted oblique decision tree to learn accurate, understandable, 
and embeddable security rules that are linear and can be extracted 
as sparse matrices using a recursive algorithm. These matrices can 
then be easily embedded as security constraints in power system 
economic dispatch calculations using the Big-M method. Tests on 
several large datasets with high renewable energy penetration 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. In 
particular, the sparse weighted oblique decision tree outperforms 
the state-of-art weighted oblique decision tree while keeping the 
security rules simple. When embedded in the economic dispatch, 
these rules significantly increase the percentage of secure states 
and reduce the average solution time. 
Index Terms—High renewable penetration, power system 
security, sparsity, oblique decision tree, rules extraction, security-
constrained economic dispatch, data-driven. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he increased uncertainty on the net load pattern that 
results from a high penetration of variable renewable 
energy generation can substantially change the operating 
modes of a power system and make the potential failure 
mechanisms more diverse [1]. A larger proportion of PV and 
wind generation reduces the system’s inertia and reduces its 
ability to mitigate contingencies[2][3]. In addition, extreme 
events are more likely to happen, such as unexpected 
cascading N-k contingencies [4], small signal instabilities, 
and voltage instabilities [5]. It is thus becoming harder to 
define accurate and understandable rules that can be used to 
reliably assess the security of the system and substantiate 
preventive control actions [6]. Defining these security 
boundaries and embedding them in the economic dispatch is 
thus essential to the reliable and optimal operation of power 
systems with a high renewable penetration. While some 
operational boundaries can be expressed by analytical 
expressions, this is not always possible, particularly when 
considering the stochastic nature of operation. One could 
instead extract rules or constraints based on simulated 
system operating data. 
A number of authors [7][8][9][10] have used decision 
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trees (DT) to learn rules for assessing the dynamic or voltage 
stability of power system operating states. Recently, 
researchers have developed techniques to embed these rules 
in power system optimization programs [11][12][13]. 
Most of these previous studies use univariate decision tree 
(UDT) such as CART [14], ID3 [15], C4.5 [16] for defining 
these rules. However, UDTs have several limitations that 
hinder extraction of accurate and embeddable rules:  
1) Because UDTs split on only one feature at each node, 
their learning capacity is limited and more likely to result in 
under-fitting when learning complex rules with a shallow 
tree; 
2) Because the knowledge UDT acquire at each node is 
limited, they tend to be very deep, with an exponentially 
increasing number of leaves. Such a complex structure 
makes the rules impossible to understand. They are also hard 
to embed in optimizations because each leaf must be 
modeled as an integer variable in optimization;  
3) Because at each node the candidate split value is chosen 
from the feature values in the samples, UDT rules can alter 
significantly with minor changes in only a few samples.  
To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes a 
technique to develop sparse weighted oblique decision trees 
(SWODT) to learn sparse security rules. The Orthant-Wise 
Limited-memory Quasi-Newton (OWL-QN) method is 
modified to solve the non-smooth optimization problem 
required to obtain the split parameters at each node. We also 
propose a recursive method to extract sparse matrix rules 
from the sparse weighted oblique decision tree. The Big-M 
method is then used to embed these sparse matrix rules as 
security constraints in a Mixed Integer Linear Programming 
(MILP) power system economic dispatch. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II briefly reviews the literature on the application of 
decision trees to power system security assessment and 
security-constrained economic dispatch. Section III 
describes the data-driven framework used in this paper. 
Section IV introduces the SWODT and its training algorithm. 
Section V explains how to extract sparse matrix rules and 
embed them in economic dispatch. Section VI demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the proposed method on several test 
systems with a high penetration of renewable generation. 
Section VII concludes. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
As mentioned above, a number of authors have developed 
techniques to learn security rules using decision trees. For 
instance, Sun et al. trained a DT offline and used the learned 
security rules for online dynamic security assessment with 
real-time PMU measurements. The results showed that DTs 
can identify key security indicators for large real-world 
power system [7]. Diao et al. also trained a DT offline for 
online voltage security assessment and updated periodically 
to improve real-time performance and robustness [9]. Other 
researchers use the DT rules for preventive and corrective 
control [17][18][19]. For example, Genc et al. utilize the DT 
to learn security regions and boundaries and provide 
guidelines for preventive and corrective controls, such as 
load shedding and generation re-dispatch [17]. 
Voumvoulakis et al. train two DTs for power system 
dynamic security assessment and corrective control, 
respectively [18]. DT rules have also been applied to power 
system cascading events [20] and emergency control [21] 
[22]. For instance, Bernabeu et al. developed a DT-based 
scheme to reduce the possibility of hidden failures and 
cascading events by adjusting the balance between security 
and dependability [20]. Senroy et al. developed DT rules 
using simulation data to identify pre-conditions when a 
power system should be split into islands [21]. Note that 
these applications to security assessment, as well as 
preventive corrective and emergency control were 
conducted in a context of a low penetration of renewable 
generation. 
Recently, some authors have investigated how security 
rules could be embedded in economic dispatch model to 
handle the increasing penetration of variable generation. For 
instance, Thams et al. presented a data-driven security-
constrained optimal power flow framework. They first use 
the DT to learn rules for both small signal stability and 
steady-state security, and then embedded these rules as 
constraints in a DCOPF to minimize re-dispatching actions 
[11]. Halilbasic et al. extend this method to embed the 
security rules in an ACOPF. They proposed a second-order 
cone relaxation to transform the security-constrained 
problem into a solvable convex mixed-integer OPF 
formulation [12]. Cremer et al. used ensemble decision tree 
(AdaBoost) to learn the power system security boundary. 
They relied on generalized disjunctive programming to 
extract DT rules and then embedded the rules in a DCOPF 
to balance cost and risk [13]. 
III.  DATA-DRIVEN FRAMEWORK  
Security rules derived from a DT must satisfy three 
fundamental requirements: 
1. Highly accurate: the rules must reflect as accurately as 
possible actual system operating conditions. To achieve 
this, the DT must have a high learning capacity and they 
should be easily grouped into ensembles when necessary.  
2. Understandable: power system operators must be able to 
obtain an intuitive understanding of the justification for 
each rule. To achieve this goal, the DT should be sparse, 
have low depth, and be able to learn the correlations 
among power system features. 
3. Embeddable in optimization: some security or stability 
constraints do not have an analytical form that can be 
embedded in optimization problems. Therefore, the DT 
should be able to learn complex security boundaries and 
extract linear rules, which can be introduced as 
constraints in these optimization problems. Embeddable 
rules should involve a small number of integer variables 
and nonzero parameters. In other words, there should be 
as few as possible leaves in a single sparse DT. 
 
To satisfy these requirements, this paper uses the three-
stage, data-driven framework for rules extraction based on a 
sparse oblique decision tree illustrated on Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Framework for power system security rules extraction and embedding. 
A.  Stage I---Generation of a large dataset of power system 
operating states through simulation 
Since actual datasets of insecure power system operating 
states are rare, simulation results are needed to generate 
sufficient data. Without loss of generality, this paper focuses 
on N-k security analysis in power system with high 
renewable penetration. First, wind and PV generations are 
simulated using stochastic differential equations considering 
spatial-temporal correlations [6]. Next, an economic 
dispatch is run to determine the operating state. Line outage 
distribution factors (LODF) are then applied to evaluate the 
N-k security of this state [23]. This process is repeated to 
generate a dataset P of power system states with security 
labels y: 
       1 1 2 2, , , , , ,N Ny yp yP p p    (1) 
An operating state vector p includes the power flow l , unit 
generation g  , renewable energy generation r  , and load d  
features: 
 ( , , , , 1)T T T T Tp g r l d   (2) 
where the last feature is always “1” to learn offset. The labels
y S , where S  is the set of security labels, which in this 
paper is  0, 1S  , where 0 denotes an insecure state and 1 
denotes a secure state. It should be noted that the features of 
the operating state are not unique and are chosen depending 
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on the type of security problem considered.  
B.  Stage II---Training of a sparse oblique decision tree 
The dataset of security-labeled operating states is high-
dimensional and correlated. To learn sparse and linear 
security rules that satisfy the three requirements highlighted 
above, we develop an algorithm to build sparse weighted 
oblique decision trees (SWODT) that can be used as a 
classifier for power system security assessments. An oblique 
decision tree has an improved learning capacity because it 
splits at each node based on a linear combination of values 
of several features rather than on the value of a single feature. 
Sparsity in the parameters of this linear split is achieved by 
minimizing an impurity index and elastic net regularization.  
C.  Stage III—Extraction of the rules and embedding in 
economic dispatch 
Sparse rules are extracted from the SWODT using a 
recursive algorithm. Each leaf of the decision tree with a 
secure label is extracted as a sparse matrix that reflects the 
direction of the split at each node. This matrix is then 
embedded as security constraints in the economic dispatch 
using the Big-M method. This security constrained 
economic dispatch problem is a MILP, which can be solved 
using a standard software package. 
IV.  SPARSE WEIGHTED OBLIQUE DECISION TREE 
A.  Weighted oblique decision tree (WODT) 
Oblique decision trees have an expanded learning capacity 
because they perform at each node a binary test using a linear 
split function Tp  rather than testing the value of a single 
feature at each node. If 0Tp  , the power system state p  
belongs to the left child node; otherwise, to the right child 
node. In the basic form, at each node the vector of parameters 
  is trained to minimize an impurity index. However, this 
approach does not converge well because the indicator 
function 0TI p     is discontinuous. To this end, Yang et al. 
developed weighted oblique decision trees (WODT) with 
weighted information entropy as an impurity index, which 
uses the smooth “soft split” sigmoid function ( )Tp   rather 
than the “hard split” indicator function 0TI p     [24]. We 
propose to further combine the weighted information 
entropy with the elastic net [25] as the objective function to 
derive split parameters of the current node. While the 
weighted information entropy makes the impurity index 
smooth and easy to optimize, the elastic net sets the 
parameters of unimportant and irrelevant features to zero 
while keeping the correlations among the important features. 
Given that the objective function is smooth in each orthant, 
we modify the OWL-QN method to solve the non-smooth 
optimization problem and recursively obtain the whole 
sparse weighted oblique decision tree. The weights of 
sample p  directed to the left Lw  and right Rw  child nodes 
are calculated as follows: 
   
=
=
L T
TR
pw
w p

 
 
  (3) 
 To obtain split parameters at each node of the WODT, the 
objective function is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )L L R RMin E W H W H         (4) 
where ( )LW   and ( )RW  are the sum of the weights of the left 
and right child nodes: 
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( )LH   and ( )RH   are the left and right information entropies: 
 
| |
|
2
|
2
1
1
( ) ( )( ) log
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) log
( ) ( )
k k
L L
L
L Lk
k k
R R
R
R R
S
S
k
W W
H
W W
W W
H
W W
 
 
 
 


 
 


  (6) 
where ( )kLW   and ( )RkW   are the sum of the weights of the 
left and right child nodes with label k; | |S  is the number of 
security categories.  
The unconstrained smooth optimization (4) can be solved 
using the L-BFGS algorithm. The WODT outperforms state-
of-art oblique decision tree algorithms such as OC [26] and 
CART-LC [14] [24]. However, some features of WODT 
limit its application in the extraction of power system 
security rules: 
Limitation 1: Because the split parameters  are dense and 
the power system data are high-dimensional, the security 
rules are impossible to understand, and hard to be embedded 
in power system optimization. 
Limitation 2: While the objective function is smooth, it is not 
convex, which affects the convergence of the L-BFGS 
algorithm. 
Limitation 3: 0    is always a stationary point of the 
optimization problem. When the initialization is poor, the 
quasi-newton algorithm converges to this meaningless point, 
which prevents the algorithm from further splitting the 
current node. This problem is more significant when   is 
sparse.  
B.  Sparse weighted oblique decision tree (SWODT) 
To extract understandable and embeddable security rules 
from the high-dimensional and highly correlated power 
system dataset, we propose a sparse weighted oblique 
decision tree. At each node of a SWODT, the objective 
function is:  
   21 2
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) + +L L R RE W H W HN
            (7) 
The first term of this function is the impurity index weighted 
information entropy divided by the number of samples N  at 
the current node. The second term provides sparsity using 
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the Lasso regularization function. The third term is the Ridge 
regularization function. The sum of the second and third 
parts is the Elastic Net [25]. Although the Lasso term alone 
can improve sparsity, the Ridge term is required for two main 
reasons: 
(1) Power system features such as line flows are highly 
correlated. Lasso tends to ignore correlations and select 
only the most important feature. Lasso also does not 
work when the number of features is greater than the 
number of samples. Adding Ridge can help the Elastic 
Net capture correlations among features and make the 
Lasso working with a large number of features while 
keeping the parameters sparse [25]. 
(2) The weighted information entropy function is 
nonconvex, while Ridge is convex everywhere in 
domain. Improving the convexity helps the quasi-
newton algorithm converge faster. If we denote the 
Hessian matrix of the first term of ( )E    by H  , the 
overall Hessian matrix on the current orthant is then 
22H I  and all eigenvalues of H  are increased by 
22  , which makes the Hessian matrix of ( )E    more 
likely to be positive definite. 
According to Eq.(6), the ranges of ( )LH   and ( )RH   are: 
 2
2
0 ( ) log (| |)
0 ( ) log (| |)R
LH S
H S


 
 
  (8) 
Therefore, the range of weighted information entropy ( )E   
is: 
 20 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) log (| |)
( ) ( )=
L L R R
L R
W H W H N S
W W N
   
 
  

  (9) 
Eq. (9) shows that the range of ( )E    depends on the 
number of samples. Because the number of samples is 
different at each node of SWODT, we would have to choose 
a suitable regularization coefficient at each one, which is 
intractable. Instead, we divide the first part of ( )E   by N  to 
reduce this range to 2[0, log (| |)]S  , which makes it 
independent of the number of samples at each node.  
The objective function (7) is non-smooth due to the Lasso 
term and thus cannot be solved using the L-BFGS method. 
However, the function is smooth on each orthant. Algorithm 
1 shows how the Orthant-Wise Limited-memory Quasi-
Newton (OWL-QN) method [27] has been modified to solve 
this non-smooth optimization problem by taking advantage 
of this feature. 
Let:   22
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) +L L R Rf W H W HN
          (10) 
Then: 1( ) ( )+E f                 (11) 
OWL-QN limits every optimization step to the current 
orthant. Then, the Hessian matrix of ( )E   on the current 
orthant is determined only by the smooth part ( )f   . 
Therefore, the traditional L-BFGS algorithm can be used to  
Algorithm 1 modified OWL-QN 
Input: initialized 0  ,  {}S   , {}Y  ,    
1: for k = 0 to MaxIters do 
2:     Calculate pseudo derivative  k kv E    with 
Eq. (12) 
3:     if ( )TY S   then 
4:         Update Hessian matrix kH  and calculate 
descent direction k k kd v H  with S, Y using L-
BFGS algorithm 
5:         Calculate constrained descent direction
 ;k k kq d v   
6:     else  
7:         Calculate descent direction k kq v  
8: end if 
9: 
 
Find a suitable step size = m   and parameter   
with constrained backtracking line search to 
satisfy: 
     1 1k k kk kE E v        
1 ( ; )= +k k kk q       
10: if termination condition satisfied then 
11: Stop and return 1k    
12: end if 
13: Update S with 1k k ks      
14: Update Y with    1kk ky f f      
15: end for 
Output: split parameters    
 
update the Hessian matrix at the current step and calculate 
descent direction kd  (Step 4). Next, the constrained descent 
direction kq  is calculated by constraining kd  with pseudo 
derivative  E    (Step 5).  E    is used to replace the 
original derivative considering the non-smooth feature of 
Lasso (Step 2): 
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  (12) 
where the derivative of ( )f   is: 
    2 2
1
1( )= 1 log +2
i
i
y
T T R L
i y
i L R
N
i i
W W
p
WW
f
N
p p      

            
   (13) 
Next, a backtracking line search is conducted to find the 
next point along the descent direction kq (Step 9). If the next 
point crosses the current orthant in the line search, it will be 
projected back to the current orthant ( +k kq   to +1k  in Fig. 
2). The projecting function   is as follows: 
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     if ( + ; )
0  otherwise 
i i
k k
i k k k
i
kq
    
   
  
  (14) 
where ( )  is sign function, k  is the current orthant.  
 
Fig. 2.  Illustration of the OWL-QN algorithm 
The current orthant k  is determined by the sign of the 
current point and pseudo derivative  kE  : 
     
 if 0
 if 0
i i
ki
k i
i
k
k kE
 



    
  (15) 
The backtracking line search in OWL-QN guarantees a 
sufficient descent at each step but may fail to satisfy
( ) 0TY S  , which is necessary to make the Hessian matrix 
positive definite in the L-BFGS method. The non-positive 
definite Hessian matrix may cause 0kq   when constrained 
by the pseudo derivative. Therefore, in this paper, if 
( )TY S  (a very small positive number), the pseudo 
derivative is used as the descent direction (Steps 3 and 7). 
This means that we adopt the first-order descent method 
when the second-order descent method is not suitable at the 
current point. Adding the strong convexity of the Ridge term 
reduces the risk of ( ) 0TY S   after the backtracking line 
search and accelerates convergence. 
Algorithm 2 shows how to construct the SWODT by 
obtaining the split parameters at each node using the 
modified OWL-QN recursively. First, if the current node is 
not identified as a leaf, then the recursion continues (step 2-
7). Since a UDT provides acceptable performance as well as 
sparsity, we use it to initialize the split parameters to 
accelerate the convergence of the proposed quasi-newton 
method (Step 8). The split parameters are calculated by 
solving the unconstraint optimization problem (7) using the 
modified OWL-QN (Step 9). If 1  is too large, the SWODT 
may still converge to the meaningless stationary point 0  . 
In such cases, we replace the SWODT by the UDT at that 
node to improve robustness and ensure that the performance 
is no worse than with the UDT (Step 10). Then, we obtain 
the training data L, R for the left and right child nodes with 
hard split ( 0TI p    ). The process continues recursively 
for the left and right child nodes (Steps 11-13) until reaching 
a leaf node. 
Algorithm 2 SparseSubtree(P, D, d, J) of the Sparse 
Weighted Oblique Decision Tree 
Input: Training data P, maximum depth D, depth of 
current node d，minimum number of sample to split J  
1: Create a node Tr based on training data P 
2: if ( )len P J  or d D  then 
3:     Node Tr is a leaf node labeled as majority class k 
in P 
4: end if 
5: if all samples in P belongs to same class k  then 
6:     Node Tr is a leaf node labeled with class k 
7: end if 
8: Initialize the split parameters 0   with univariate 
decision tree 
9: Calculate the split parameters   by solving the 
unconstraint optimization problem (7) using 
Algorithm 1 with initial point 0  
10: if 0   then 0   end if 
11: Obtain training data L, R for left and right child 
nodes, respectively 
12: The left child node Tr: SparseSubtree(L, D, d + 1, 
J) 
13: The right child node Tr: SparseSubtree(R, D, d + 1, 
J) 
Output: A sparse oblique decision tree with root node Tr 
 
V.  RULES EXTRACTION AND EMBEDDING 
A.  Rules extraction 
 
Fig. 3.  Illustration of the rule extraction algorithm 
Algorithm 3 and Fig. 3 show how to extract the sparse 
rules matrix recursively from the SWODT. If the current 
node is identified as a leaf node with secure label “1”, then 
the security rules of the leaf are extracted as a sparse matrix 
R  (Steps 1-3). Otherwise, for each node, the current split 
considering direction Tk  is added to the last row of rules 
matrix R  to represent the rules of left and right child nodes 
respectively (Step 5). 1k     and 1k    denote 
respectively the left split ( 0T p  ) and right split ( 0T p  ), 
as shown in Fig. 3. The process continues recursively for the 
left and right subtrees until reaching a secure leaf (Steps 7-
11). If iR  denotes the sparse rules matrix of the ith secure leaf 
of the SWOT, the corresponding rules can be expressed as: 
 0iR p    (16)  
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Algorithm 3 RuleFromSubtree(Tr, R) of SWODT 
Input: SWODT node Tr 
1: if Tr is a leaf node and the class label is 1 then 
2:     return R 
3: end if 
4: for k  in { 1,1}  
5:     Concatenate vector Tk  to the row of matrix R 
6:     if 1k    then 
7:         Extract rules from left subtree Tr_left: 
RuleFromSubtree(Tr_left, R) 
8:     end if 
9:     if 1k   then 
10:         Extract rules from right subtree Tr_right: 
RuleFromSubtree(Tr_right, R) 
11:     end if 
12: end for 
Output: Sparse rules matrix R 
B.  Embedding security rules in economic dispatch  
Given Eq.(16), if the SWODT has G  secure leaves, then 
the sparse security rules of the whole tree can be formulated 
as security constraints using Big-M method: 
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  (17) 
where iI  is the binary variable representing ith leaf of the 
SWODT and M is a sufficiently large positive number. In Eq. 
(17), the last equation indicates that only one rule needs to 
be satisfied to obtain a secure power system state. However, 
this equation is not actually needed because any sample 
belongs to one and only one leaf. Embedding Eq. (17) in an 
economic dispatch yields a secure system operating state. 
Since these equations are linear, this security-constrained 
economic dispatch can be solved using a standard MILP 
solver if DCOPF is used. This solution does not require too 
much computing time because Eq. (16) is sparse. 
VI.  CASE STUDIES 
A.  Description of the case data 
Three power system test systems (IEEE-30, RTS-GMLC 
[28], NREL-118 [29]) with high renewable penetrations are 
used in this paper to validate the proposed method. Table I 
gives the structure and generation capacity of these three 
cases. The IEEE-30 case is modified from the standard 
IEEE-30 case. A 50 MW PV farm and a 50 MW wind farm 
were added at each one of buses #10, #24, and #28. The 
capacity of renewable energy is thus 300 MW, which is 47% 
of the total generation capacity. The RTS-GMLC case was 
created by NREL to replace RTS-96 for high renewable 
penetrated power system reliability assessment. The hydro, 
wind, and PV generation capacities are 1000 MW, 2508 MW, 
and 2716 MW, respectively, accounting for 43% of the total 
capacity. Day ahead forecasts and actual time-series data of 
hydro, wind, and PV production, as well as load based on 
actual power systems are provided. The NREL-118 dataset 
was also introduced by NREL to add a high renewable 
penetration to the original IEEE-118 case. The hydro, wind, 
and PV capacities are 10157 MW, 1078 MW, and 3446 MW, 
respectively, accounting for 36% of the total generation 
capacity.  
8000 power flow simulations were performed on each 
dataset to obtain N-1 security-labeled samples to train 
decision trees. These three datasets are used to compare the 
original weighted oblique decision tree (WDOT), the 
proposed sparse weighted oblique decision tree with Lasso 
only as regularization and solved by modified OWL-QN 
(SWODTL), the proposed sparse weighted oblique decision 
tree (SWODT). Metrics of accuracy and sparsity, as well as 
number of leaves, and computing times were calculated on 
the three datasets using 5-fold cross validation. 
  
TABLE I: Description of the three test cases 
Year IEEE-30 RTS-GMLC 
NREL-
118 
Hydro capacity (MW) 0 1000 10157 
Thermal capacity (MW) 335 8326 25837 
Wind capacity (MW) 150 2508 1078 
PV capacity (MW) 150 2716 3446 
Renewable capacity penetration 47% 43% 36% 
Peak load (MW) 265 8192 18063 
Number of buses/branches 30/43 73/120 118/186 
Number of total/renewable 
generators 12/6 158/60 160/92 
B.  Accuracy and training time  
 
Fig. 4.  Accuracy and training time of the three oblique decision trees for the 
three datasets 
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Fig. 4 shows the accuracy and training time of the three 
oblique DTs (WODT, SWODTL, and SWODT) against the 
depth of the DT on three datasets. The error rate is defined 
as the average ratio of the numbers of insecure and total 
states in 5-fold validation dataset. When the depth of the DT 
is low (depth 1 and 2 in IEEE-30 and NREL-118, depth 1 in 
RTS-GMLC), the accuracy of the three methods is 
comparable, possibly due to underfitting. When the depth of 
DT increases, the accuracy of SWODT and SWODTL is 
similar and both have much better performance 
(approximately 2%) than the original WODT (such as depth 
3-6 in IEEE-30 and NREL-118, depth 2-6 in RTS-GMLC). 
This is because the Lasso and Ridge regularization avoid 
possible overfitting and reduce generalization errors by 
making the security rules simple when the DT is deep. These 
results suggest that oblique DTs have a strong capacity to 
learn security rules. 
The average training time of the three methods increases 
approximately linearly with the depth of the trees. However, 
the training time required by the SWODTL is about 5 times 
larger than for the WODT and 3 times larger than for the 
SWODT because the strong non-convexity of SWODTL 
objective function makes the modified OWL-QN algorithm 
converge slowly. The training times of the SWODT and 
WODT are close because the Ridge accelerates SWODT’s 
convergence, although the modified OWL-QN limits the 
update on current orthant. These results show that SWODT 
has better performance than WODT while consuming much 
less training time than SWODTL. 
C.  Sparsity and number of leaves  
 
Fig. 5.  Sparsity and number of leaves of the three oblique decision trees for the 
three datasets 
Fig. 5 compares the sparsity and the number of leaves of 
the three oblique DTs (WODT, SWODTL, and SWODT) 
against the regularization coefficient on the three datasets. 
The regularization coefficient of SWODT is set as 1 2  . 
The depth is set as 6 for all DTs. Sparsity in this paper is 
defined as the proportion of non-zero parameters in the rule 
matrix. The sparsity of the WODT is approximately 1 for all 
three datasets, which means that its rules matrix is very 
dense. The security rules are then complex and impossible to 
understand. The sparsity of SWODTL and SWODT 
decreases as the regularization coefficient increases and 
approaches 0 for a sufficiently large regularization 
coefficient. The security rules derived from SWODTL and 
SWODT can therefore be made very simple by choosing a 
suitable regularization coefficient. The sparsity of the 
SWODTL decreases faster than that of the SWODT because 
the SWODTL ignores the correlations and only keeps the 
parameters of the most important feature. The WODT has an 
average of 29.4, 43, and 32 leaves on the IEEE-30, RTS-
GMLC, and NREL-118 datasets, respectively, nearly twice 
as many as for the SWODT and SWODTL when these use a 
suitable regularization coefficient. A smaller number of 
leaves leads to fewer rules matrices and fewer integer 
variables that must be embedded in the security constrained 
economic dispatch. The small number of leaves and sparsity 
also make the SWODT much easier to be understood than 
WODT. The graphs on the right also show that adjusting the 
regularization coefficient also reduces the error rate. For 
these three datasets, the suitable coefficients are 0.05, 0.05 
and 0.001 for the IEEE-30, RTS-GMLC, and NREL-118, 
respectively.  
D.  Embedding Rules 
To validate the effectiveness of the extracted security 
rules, we embedded the rules as constraints in an economic 
dispatch for the three datasets, generated 2000 new operating 
states by randomly changing renewable energy generation 
and load. We then assessed whether these states met the 
operating constraints and calculated the ratio of the numbers 
of secure and total states. As a reference, an economic 
dispatch without security constraints results in 62.2%, 76.0% 
and 52.9% of secure states for the IEEE-30, RTS-GMLC, 
and NREL-118 datasets, respectively. After embedding the 
rules from the three oblique DTs, the percentage of secure 
states produced by the economic dispatch improved from 
62.2% to over 95% for the IEEE-30 (WODT: 95.0%, 
SWODTL: 95.1%, SWODT: 95.9%), from 76.0% to over 
80.0% for the RTS-GMLC (WODT: 80.0%, SWODTL: 
80.3%, SWODT: 85.1%), and from 52.9% to over 74.0% for 
the NREL-118 (WODT: 74.0%, SWODTL: 85.4%, SWODT: 
93.5%). These results indicate that the SWODT outperforms 
both WODT and SWODTL because the dense structure 
limits the generalization capability of WODT, and SWODTL 
ignores the correlations among the power system features. 
Fig. 6 summarizes these results and also shows that, thanks 
to its sparse rules matrices and smaller number of integer 
variables, the SWODT also outperforms WODT and 
SWODTL based on the solution time averaged over all cases 
and all three datasets. The time difference between the 
WODT and the SWODT is more significant in a larger 
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power system (0.05s on the IEEE-30 against 0.1s on the 
NREL-118). The simulation platform is a workstation with 
an Intel i7 CPU@2.11 GHz, 32 GB of RAM. The MILP 
economic dispatch problem is solved by Gurobi 8.0. 
 
Fig. 6.  Percentage of secure states and average solution time when embedding 
the security rules extracted from the WODT, SWODT, SWODTL in a security 
constrained economic dispatch for the IEEE-30, RTS-GMLC, and NREL-118 
datasets 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a technique based on sparse weighted 
oblique decision trees to learn security rules in power 
systems with a high penetration of variable renewable 
generation. The sparse weighted oblique decision tree 
defines accurate, understandable, and embeddable security 
rules that can be extracted as sparse matrices and then 
embedded in economic dispatch as linear security 
constraints. The effectiveness of the proposed method is 
validated on the IEEE-30, RTS-GMLC and NREL-118 
datasets. The results show that the sparse weighted oblique 
decision tree outperforms the state-of-art weighted oblique 
decision tree while keeping the security rules sparse and 
simple. Embedding the sparse security rules in power system 
economic dispatch can significantly increase the percentage 
of insecure states and reduce the average solution time of the 
security-constrained economic dispatch. 
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